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1. Immunity, Accountability and Judicial Independence
When a regime commits itself to the oppression of its people, by persecuting minorities 
or political opponents, depriving people of their personal liberty and even outright kill-
ings, we do not hesitate to hold those responsible accountable. We blame the politicians 
and leaders who make the decisions, and also those who implement the evil measures. 
In some cases, leaders employ the service of the courts in order to obtain their aims 
of oppression. Repression may take place both outside of and inside of the law. Once it is 
judges who order and enforce the oppressive measures are ordered and enforced by judg-
es, they are often perceived differently from when they are taken outside of the scope of 
the judiciary. Judges in fact have a high degree of protection from responsibility for their 
judicial actions. Historical examples show that it is very difficult to make judges account-
able for their conduct on the bench.
Take the example of the  ‘euthanasia’ programme of Nazi Germany that killed more 
than seventy thousand people. Most would not hesitate in characterising this as a pro-
gramme of extermination, and call for the punishment of those taking part in it.1 The 
same characteristic is not often used to describe the institution of special and military 
courts that killed more than thirty-five thousand people, many of them between 1941 
and 1945. Reportedly, only one German judge was convicted for this in The Federal Re-
public of Germany. German courts after the war decided that both doctors and judges 
*         Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo.
1 See Freudiger, Die juristische Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen (Mohr Siebeck 2002) pp. 108-119.
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were acting illegally. However, whereas doctors were punished, judges could only be pun-
ished if they had acted out of malicious motives. In no case did the courts after the war 
find proof of this.
The question addressed in this paper is if, and how far, it is possible to reconcile to 
hold judges accountable under criminal law for participation in the oppression by an 
authoritarian regime, with the principle of judicial independence. On the one hand, ju-
dicial independence protects the judges against liability for acts performed in the exer-
cise of their function. On the other hand, justice demands that those responsible for the 
wrongdoings of an evil regime should be held accountable, even under conditions where 
the wrongdoings were sanctioned by the law of the regime. There is a vast and growing 
amount of literature on judicial independence.2 However, surprisingly little of this deal 
with the issue of criminal liability of judges and most seems to take for granted that a 
judge must have immunity against criminal sanctions. I will challenge this idea in the 
following.
There are other ways of sanctioning judicial wrongdoing than by criminal law, notably 
through disciplinary measures and the removal of judges. In particular, codes of judicial 
conduct and mechanisms for enforcing judicial discipline seem to be on the rise and 
playing an increasingly important role for the legitimacy of the judicial function.3 There 
are connections and relations between the different sanctions, which all raise issues of 
judicial independence. In some jurisdictions, such as the US and Germany, the remov-
al of a judge requires proof of criminal conduct or a serious abuse of office.4 The same 
conditions for removal are consistently prescribed by the Venice Commission. In other 
jurisdictions, the inability of a judge to function in a normal way in a collegial work-en-
vironment may be grounds for dismissal. A Norwegian judge was recently dismissed on 
this ground after a legal procedure in the normal courts.5
I will, however, not elaborate on the use of other sanctions than criminal liability. I 
am also not primarily concerned with the sanctioning of aberrant judges operating in a 
society where the rule of law is respected as a general rule. My focus will primarily be on 
judges who have collaborated with regimes that negate or undermine the rule of law in a 
more systematic way. Yet, since the liability of judges, and the other side of the coin, ju-
2 See for example Salas and Épineuse (eds.) L’ étique de juge: une approche européenne et 
internationale (Dalloz 2003), Judicial Independence in Transition, ed. Siebert-Fohr (Springer 
2012) and The Independence of Judges, eds. Engstad, Frøseth and Tønder (eleven international 
publishing 2014).
3 See Di Federico, Judicial Accountability and Conduct: An Overview in Judicial Independence in 
Transition, ed. Siebert-Fohr (Springer 2012) p. 89.
4 See Jackson, Judicial Independence: Structure, Context, Attitude, in Judicial Independence in 
Transition, ed. Siebert-Fohr (Springer 2012) p. 51.
5 See case no LB-2013-171610-2 by Borgarting lagmannsrett (Court of Appeals) 1 July 2014.
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dicial immunity, are inextricably linked with the status of the judge, my conclusions will 
inevitably be of general relevance.
The question of holding judges responsible for upholding oppressive laws has direct 
relevance beyond the case of the Nazi judges. Not all judicial oppression has the extreme 
character of Nazism - in some situations involvement of the courts is necessary to dispose 
of political enemies by death or imprisonment. In other cases, the use of the courts may 
only be a matter of choice or of convenience.6 In the legalistic culture of 21st century Eu-
rope, authoritarian rulers often see the need to involve the courts in their desire to hold 
onto power. For example under the so-called Revolution of Dignity in Kiev, Ukraine, 
November 2013 to February 2014, the courts participated in the endeavours of the state 
to quash the protests. According to a study of approximately 500 cases from first instance 
and appeal courts, from 21 December 2013 to 22 February 2014, this was done largely 
under disregard of procedural rules and safeguards of the Ukrainian constitution and law 
of criminal procedure.7 
The public opinion after the fall of Yanukovych was outraged, and demanded that 
the judges should be held responsible for their participation in the suppression of the 
protesters against the regime. Laws were enacted by the parliament to this end, and in-
stitutions to investigate were established, but up to now only a few judges have been held 
accountable.
The experiences from these two very different historical events are typical when it 
comes to the dealing with judges in authoritarian settings - justice demands to hold also 
judges accountable. Nevertheless, like their colleagues in societies that uphold and re-
spect the rule of law, such judges are in practice awarded immunity for their judicial 
actions, an immunity that is even to a point demanded by the rule of law itself. Judges 
in authoritarian - and Rule - of - Law societies alike are protected by an appeal to the 
important principle of judicial independence, which protects against personal liability 
for judicial decisions. The immunity of judges should not be without limits, however, 
and should not go further than what the rule of law requires. Judges should not only be 
independent, they should also be accountable.
The purpose of this article is to examine how far, with due respect for the rule of law, 
criminal sanctions could be applied to judges for the exercise of their judicial functions. 
My main focus will be on situations where judges are employed by the holders of power 
in the realisation of political oppression. In order to address this question it is necessary 
to look into the criminal responsibility of judges more generally. Applying criminal sanc-
6 See Kirchheimer, Political Justice The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton 
University Press 1961) pp. 95-96 and 419 ff.
7 Navrotskyi, Fair, Independent and Accountable Judiciary in Ukraine Analysis of the Practice of 
Custodial Measures Enforcement During the «Revolution of Dignity» Events, unpublished paper 
produced for USAID 15.10.2015.
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tions to a judge for his or her judicial action may challenge the principle of judicial inde-
pendence. Still, should this principle award judges with a greater immunity from punish-
ment than other servants of an oppressive state? My focus will mainly be on instances of 
transition, from an authoritarian setting to the rule of law. In such instances, standards 
change. What was perceived as necessary and defensible under certain conditions may be 
perceived as illegitimate under the new conditions. 
The question of judicial liability can also arise when conditions are stable. Even with-
in a well-functioning judiciary that operates in accordance with the rule of law, one can 
sometimes come across instances where a judge deviates from the norm. He may for 
instance accept bribes or hand down decisions that depart from what anyone will recog-
nise as a reasonable judgement of the facts or application of the law. The need to punish 
such offences must be balanced against the principle of judicial immunity. Under the 
condition of well-functioning courts, this balance is achieved by the fact that the aberrant 
judge is tried by his peers. This ensures that the effect on the judicial role is taken into 
account, and that it is not undermined by penalizing a judge.8
In transitional settings, the same principle applies. However, the justification of  pun-
ishment under normal circumstances cannot be applied so easily to situations where 
wrongdoings are common and sanctioned by the state.9 In addition, in many cases of 
transition, the role of the judiciary is precarious, and the rule of law often not yet prop-
erly entrenched. This increases the risk that sanctioning judges undermine judicial 
independence and thus pave the way for the rule of law more difficult. On the other hand, 
it may be argued that holding judges accountable for their participation in the misdeeds 
of an oppressive regime is important to strengthen the role of the judiciary in a post-au-
thoritarian society.10 
After some introductory remarks on transitional justice, I will present the interna-
tional standard of judicial immunity and the reasons behind it (2). Then I will present the 
normative basis for holding judges accountable by referring to some different examples 
8 Standards change also in societies with institutions continuously based on democracy and rule 
of law. In many of the Western democracies, values and perceptions have changed, in particular 
regarding the treatment and rights of minorities such as indigenous peoples and travelling 
people. Some decades ago, many countries practiced hard policies of assimilation that entailed 
prohibition of minority languages and even measures of sterilisation of women and removal 
of children into the custody of public bodies. Judged by today’s standards such measures are 
immoral and illegal. I will not address the difficult issue of whether and how to deal with officials 
or judges responsible for implementing such policies under current standards. For a more 
general treatment of how societies are trying to right the wrongs of the past see Historical Justice 
in International Perspective How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past, eds. Berg 
and Schaefer (Cambridge University Press 2008).
9 Murphy, Transitional Justice, Retributive Justice and Accountability for Wrongdoing in 
Theorizing Transitional Justice, eds. Corradetti, Eisikovis and Rotondi (Ashgate 2015) pp. 63-66.
10 Yusuf, Transitional Justice, Judicial accountability and the Rule of Law (Routledge 2010) p. 184
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of national laws (3). Rules are one thing, practices another. The next section looks into 
the few historical examples of judges that have been held accountable under criminal law 
(4). Finally, I will make the case for an increased liability for judges under certain circum-
stances, and the conditions that must be fulfilled (5).
2. Challenges of Transitional Justice and Judicial Immunity
Transitional justice, in the form of criminal sanctions against members of a past oppres-
sive regime, has its dilemmas and legal challenges.11 For this purpose, many countries for 
good reasons opt for more conciliatory approaches.12 Having overcome the authoritarian 
stage, the country often needs to look forward to establish robust and just institutions. In 
order to achieve this, many societies have decided not to dwell on injustices of the past. 
Such considerations also enter the picture when one is considering the responsibility 
of judges for the wrongdoings of the previous regime. Nevertheless, holding judges ac-
countable raises difficult questions, in addition to all the general questions of transitional 
justice. It is widely held that the independence of the judiciary rules out any liability for 
judges based on their interpretation and application of the law, and that this also applies 
to transitionary situations. 
Judges hold a special position when it comes to being held accountable for oppressive 
measures enacted by those in power of the legislator or the executive. Judges should not 
have to deliberate and take into account what consequences a ruling might have for them 
personally.13 Lack of immunity might also leave the path open for applying pressure on 
judges to decide in accordance with the wishes of those in power. According to widely 
held views, judges should not be held accountable for their actions in this role by other 
means than an obligation to give reasons, and being subject to review through a system 
of appeal. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe states in its recommen-
dation on judges that: 
the interpretation of the law, assessment of facts or weighing of evidence carried out by 
judges to determine cases should not give rise to civil or disciplinary liability, except in 
cases of malice and gross negligence.14
11 See Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press 2000) chapter two.
12 See Rotondi and Eisikovits, Forgetting after War: A Qualified Defense, in Theorizing Transitional 
Justice, eds. Corradetti, Eisikovis and Rotondi (Ashgate 2015).
13 See Helmke, Courts under Constraints Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) for a theoretical and empirical account of how fear of sanction may 
influence judicial decision-making. Under given conditions, any judge may opt to act strategically, 
see Helmke p. 34.
14 Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: 
independence, efficiency and responsibilities paragraph 66.
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Criminal sanctions should only be applied ‘in cases of malice’.15 According to this rec-
ommendation, a judge should only be held accountable if he acted with the intent to 
misapply the law for extraneous reasons. One could say that such a judge is not acting as 
a judge, but is pursuing illegitimate aims under the cover of law.
This statement underscores the immunity of judges, but also the limits of such im-
munity. Judges are generally not protected from sanctions against misconduct and gross 
misbehaviour, such as corruption or misuse of power. As stated by the Consultative 
Council of European Judges, ‘the corollary of the powers and the trust conferred by society 
upon judges is that there should be some means of holding judges responsible, and even re-
moving them from office, in cases of misbehaviour so gross as to justify such a course’.16 Such 
standards mostly refer to the extra-judicial activities of judges, or to their use of their 
power to follow extraneous goals. When it comes to their well-intended judicial acts, 
things are different. According to this, judges are, after all, only applying the laws that 
they themselves are not responsible for. Consequently, they must be given wide margins 
for mistakes and oversights, even if this amounts to clear misapplication of the law. 
In many countries, a judge has immunity without the distinction between official 
and unofficial actions. The Polish Constitutional Court states the purpose behind such 
immunity in a ruling on an amendment of the Polish act:
International regulations emphasise that not only the actual, but also the apparent 
dependence of courts (judges) in their jurisprudential practice on factors other than the 
requirements of the law may constitute an infringement of the standards of the inde-
pendence of courts and judges. It stems from the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights that immunity protects guardians of the administration of justice 
against the influence from political groups, provocation, retaliation or external pressure. 
In fact, immunity serves to ensure the stabilisation of adjudication by way of limiting 
the possibility of the exertion of influence on the content thereof by factors from outside 
the administration of justice. The mechanism constitutes a guarantee of the separate-
ness of the judiciary from other powers. Furthermore, its goal is to protect the integrity 
of judges exposed to a revenge on the part of persons who had been judged contrary to 
their expectations.17
The court here expressed what could be seen as the more general rationale behind 
judicial immunity, which is accepted in most countries. Similarly, the European Com-
mission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) sees the issue of criminal and 
15 See paragraph 68.
16 Opinion no 3 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the principles and 
rules governing judges’ professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and 
impartiality paragraph 51. 
17 Judgement of 28th November 2007, K 39/07 PROCEDURE FOR DEROGATION OF JUDICIAL 
IMMUNITY (OTK ZU 2007, No. 10A, item 129 ) paragraph 14 (accessed 20.05.2016 at http://
trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/K_39_07_GB.pdf) 
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civil liability and immunity of judges in the light of the importance to safeguard judicial 
freedom from undue external influence.  In the view of the Commission, however, this 
does not reach further than to protect judges against liability for acts performed in the 
exercise of their function. Outside of his or her judicial function, there is not the same ba-
sis for giving judges a privileged position against criminal investigation and charges. The 
Venice Commission therefore consistently opposes legislation on immunity that extends 
beyond functional immunity.18 However, judges should enjoy functional immunity, ac-
cording to the commission, with the exception of intentional crimes, e.g. taking bribes.19 
The reasons to give judges immunity are general in their application, and are held 
to be relevant in cases against judges of former oppressive regimes. Offensive as their 
rulings might be, judges are often neither making the law, nor breaking it. Their role 
is to apply the law, and to disregard their own personal moral or political assessments 
of the appropriateness of the law that they are applying. In relation to Ukrainian reac-
tions against judges who enforced measures against people taking part in protests on the 
winter of 2013-2014, the Venice Commission has stated that it is ‘essential not to blame 
judges for’ rulings in ‘cases which at the time when the judge took the decision  did represent 
criminal offences’.20
This approach is based on a view of the judge, which is not wholly satisfactory. Ex-
amples, particularly from the experience of post-communist states, show that judicial 
immunity is often misconstrued to cover up judicial shortcomings.21 There is often a 
scope for judicial discretion in the evaluation of the evidence and in the interpretation 
and application of the law. If a judge systematically employs this discretion in support of 
an authoritarian regime, is not the judge equally to blame as the person who enacts the 
oppressive rules? Judicial immunity is not an end in itself.22 On the other hand, judges 
should not be inhibited in their exercise of judicial discretion by the fear of someone 
disagreeing with the choices they make. This is particularly significant in the light of an 
18 See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Report on 
the Independence of the Judicial System Part 1: The Independence of Judges, adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 82nd Plenary Session, Venice, 12-13 March 2010 CDL-AD(2010)004 
paragraph 60-61.
19 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Report on the 
Independence of the Judicial System Part I: The Independence of Judges, Adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 82nd Plenary session, Venice, 12-13 March 2010 CDL-AD(2010)004. 
20 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Interim Opinion 
On the Law on Government Cleansing (Lustration Law) of Ukraine, Adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 101st Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 December 2014) CDL-AD(2014)044 
paragraph 77.
21 Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of the Central 
European Judiciaries, 14 European Public Law (2008) pp. 99-123 p. 100.
22 See further Yusuf 2010 pp. 18-20
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observed general tendency among Europe’s political classes to subject judges to control.23 
This calls for a careful balancing of the different considerations when deciding on judicial 
liability.
3. The Normative Basis for Liability
Different national laws on the criminal responsibility of judges reflect general views of 
restraint in criminalizing judicial acts. A survey performed by the Consultative Council 
of European Judges shows that some countries award the judiciary complete immunity 
from prosecution.24 In other countries, specific acts of misconduct can give rise to crim-
inal investigations. Typical examples are corruption, misuse of power and misconduct 
such as breach of rules of professional secrecy and abusive or discriminatory behaviour 
from the bench. The survey is based on the legislation of the responding countries, and 
gives no information about to what extent and how the legislation is actually enforced.
In England and Wales, judges are immune where they act in the bona fide exercise of 
their office, in the belief that they have jurisdiction.25 In some jurisdictions, the legislation 
goes further in specifying certain judicial acts that can be sanctioned as illegal. Under 
some laws, judges can be brought to account for deliberate delivery of illegal decisions or 
conscious conviction of innocent persons. 
Other countries have laws that criminalise collusion with the police and security forc-
es in the use of illegal procedures in order to obtain admissions from a defendant. Such 
judicial acts may be the ordering of illegal arrests or investigations. An example of this is 
found in Icelandic law. The law specifies the active use of illegal procedures and ordering 
of illegal arrests or investigations. One of the most common forms of judicial support to 
authoritarian measures, however, is a judicial policy of non-interference, allowing the 
regime to pursue an illegal oppression of opposition, concentrating on the substance if 
and when cases are brought to court.26 When this is regular practice, police and prose-
23 Laffranque, Judicial Independence in Europe: Principles and Reality in The Independence of 
Judges, eds. Engstad, Frøseth and Tønder (eleven international publishing 2014) p. 139.
24 See Opinion no 3 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the principles and 
rules governing judges’ professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and 
impartiality.
25 Turenne, Judicial Independence in England and Wales, in Judicial Independence in Transition, 
ed. Siebert-Fohr, (Springer 2012) p. 172.
26 See for details Graver, Judges Against Justice On Judges When the Rule of Law is Under Attack, 
(Springer 2015) chapter 4 and for a practical example from the judicial system of Ukraine ECtHR 
Case Kaverzin v. Ukraine, (Application no. 23893/03) Judgement 15 May 2012 paragraph 178. 
According to the Court, a failure by the national courts to investigate into allegations of torture of 
persons held in police custody was a systemic failure of the Ukrainian court system, perpetuating ‘a 
climate of virtually total impunity for such acts’, and constituted a violation of Article 46 of the ECHR.
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cutors can transgress the rights of the arrestees and defendants with impunity. When the 
law requires, as in Icelandic law, that illegal measures must be ordered or permitted by a 
judge, the judge can only be held responsible when it is the judge who orders or applies 
the illegal measures of investigation. One might argue that the misdeed of the judge is 
comparable to when the judge disregards a number of gross violations of the procedure 
by the police or the prosecutors, and blindly approves the arrest of a defendant or impos-
es a fine.
The problem with all laws criminalising illegal acts by judges is that the legality of an 
act often follows from the fact that it is a judicial act. In order for it to be illegal, and not 
merely wrong from a legal point of view, the judge must exceed the scope of discretion 
and interpretation that the law awards the judge. This raises no problems if the judge is 
motivated by extra-legal factors, such as revenge, the fulfilment of a promise, or obedi-
ence to an order or a threat given by an outsider, such as a superior judge or a member of 
the administration or the ruling party.  This is equally evident if the judge, in conscious 
violation of the law, takes into account what he or she perceives are in the interests of 
society or any party related or unrelated to the case at hand. Likewise, an act cannot be 
legal as a judicial act if it results from proceedings without any resemblance to the notion 
of a fair and impartial trial. Consequently, if illegality is a condition for holding a judge 
accountable, accountability in practice will only come to bear on judges with malicious 
or extra-legal motives for their acts. If one wants to extend the possibility to punish onto 
intended judicial failings, the law must also criminalise certain legal judicial acts or at 
least acts that are perceived as legal at the time they are performed.  
Yet, on what basis can one hold a judge responsible for breaking a law if he is applying 
the positive law correctly? Gustav Radbruch grappled with this question after the fall of 
the Nazi regime. His conclusion was that laws which were in flagrant contradiction with 
any conception of justice, had to be regarded as ‘unlaw’. As a result obedience to them had 
to be regarded as unlawful if the consequence were to be  the deprivation of  someones 
life or personal freedom.27 Radbruch’s answer was in other words to disregard the laws 
empowering the judge to give rulings. Thereby his acts would be illegal if they infringed 
on other valid legal rules, such as the prohibition to take the life of another human being 
- which was illegal also under the law of Nazi Germany. Murder is and was a criminal 
offence. The laws of Nazi Germany criminalising acts against the state were the grounds 
a judge could use to justify the ordering of an execution. But since these laws were in 
flagrant contradiction with the laws of any civilized nation, they had to be regarded as 
27 Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 
(1946) 105–108 [English translation Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, Translated 
by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2006), 
pp. 1–11].
134
Hans Petter Graver
‘unlaw’ in Radbruch’s conception. Thus, the judge’s contribution to the killing was no 
longer justified, and thus illegal.28 
A different approach follows from the observation that an action can be governed by 
different sets of rules, so that it is legal under one set, but illegal under another. After the 
war, members of the German judiciary were convicted by the US military tribunal. This 
was based on the fact that certain acts were considered crimes under international law, 
and their legality under national German law was not counted as a valid defence. The dif-
ferent rule-sets might also be different sets of national rules, so that an action performed 
under a certain regime can be illegal under the rules in force prior to or after the regime, 
when the contested rulings are made. To hold a person accountable under previous or 
succeeding legal rules means that one has to apply these rules anachronistically, for ex-
ample retroactively. This entails departing from an important part of the rule of law. This 
should, however, not be ruled out if it is necessary to fulfil other important demands of 
the rule of law. It follows, for example, from Article 7 (2) of the ECHR that the prohibi-
tion against punishment without law does ‘not prejudice the trial and punishment of any 
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’. In its judgement 
on the responsibilities of the leaders of the GDR for the killing of persons trying to cross 
the border into West-Germany, the ECtHR stated that ‘the courts of such a State [a state 
governed by the rule of law] having taken the place of those which existed previously, can-
not be criticised for applying and interpreting the legal provisions in force at the material 
time in the light of the principles governing a State subject to the rule of law’.29 The aim of the 
prohibition against retroactive law as a basis for punishment is to prevent anyone from 
being subjected to arbitrary prosecution, conviction or punishment. However, to sanc-
tion flagrant departures from the rule of law and serious infringements of basic human 
rights is not arbitrary from the point of view of the rule of law.
28 Following the debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart in 1957 there has been a large number 
of contributions to the discussion of whether the concept of law must include or exclude unjust 
laws. This theoretical question is not my focus here. I am merely looking for different ways to 
argue for holding judges accountable for misdeeds that are regarded as legal at the time they are 
committed.
29 ECtHR case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany (Applications nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 
44801/98) judgement 22 March 2001 paragraph 81.
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4. Judicial Liability in Practice 
4.1 Introduction
Experience shows that judges are rarely brought to answer for their oppressive deeds 
from the bench.30 Successor regimes in general seem to be more concerned with recon-
ciliation and bridging social clefts than about retribution and criminal sanctions. Even in 
cases where perpetrators of the oppression are brought to account, the judges are treated 
more leniently than others are. 
There are, in fact, only two instances in recent history where the responsibility of judg-
es has been the serious concern of criminal law, both in settings of transitional justice; 
after the breakdown of the Nazi regime, and after the reunification of the two German 
states in the 1990s. The judiciary was a topic for the Truth and Reconciliation committees 
of South Africa and Chile. It was subject to criticism, but no sanctions were applied.
In Ukraine, there has been discussions about holding judges accountable, both for 
their role in the suppression of political opposition during the 2013-2014 protests, and 
for their protection of officials involved in serious crimes against protesters. A judge, who 
released a commanding officer under suspicion of commanding a unit which shot dead 
49 protesters on 20 February 2014, was later made the subject of criminal proceedings 
under the suspicion of making a deliberate unjust ruling.31 Disciplinary measures have 
also been taken against a handful of other judges involved.
4.2 The post-Nazi Cases
The main body of case law on criminal responsibility of judges in oppressive regimes thus 
stems from the few international and national cases after World War II and from German 
cases after the reunification.32 The main international case is the US Military Tribunal 
30 See Graver 2015, Dommernes krig (Pax 2015) where I give a more detailed references and an 
account of judicial complicity in several authoritarian regimes in Western countries in the late 
twentieth century.
31 See Report of the Council of Europe Advisory Panel on its review of the Maidan Investigations, 
31 March 2015 pp. 80-82.
32 The trails conducted in countries under Soviet influence after World War II, such as the 
Waldheimer trials in the GDR in the beginning of the 1950ies were mere show trials directed by 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, see Falco Wertkentin, Strafjustiz im politischen 
System der DDR: Fundstücke zur Steuerungs- und Eingriffspraxis des zentralen Parteiapparates 
der SED in Steuerung der Justiz in der DDR Einflussnah, ed. Rottleuthner. Such trials can therefore 
not be counted as examples of defendants being held accountable under criminal law, but must 
rather be seen as administrative acts in disguise, see Kirchheimer 1961 p. 426.
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‘Justice Case’ against leading officials of the Nazi legal system.33 The accused were tried 
under international law and convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity.34 
Most of the accused had held office in the Ministry of Justice, and were convicted for 
their role in developing and implementing rules based on the policies of the Nazi regime. 
These convictions do not raise the issue of holding judges accountable in their capacity 
as judges. 
Those convicted in a judicial capacity were found guilty of discriminatory persecu-
tion and application of oppressive laws against Jews and Poles, as well as of applying and 
enforcing the Nacht und Nebel legislation against nationals from occupied countries. This 
programme was a scheme where persons accused of resistance were brought to Germany 
and convicted in secrecy. They had no opportunity to defend themselves and were sub-
sequently brought to disappear in the ‘night and fog’ of the concentration camps. The 
tribunal did not regard as crimes judicial acts that did not involve application of schemes 
deemed as war crimes, or that were not discriminatory in a way to constitute crimes 
against humanity. Four out of the six accused, who had only acted in their judicial capac-
ity during the Nazi regime, were acquitted by the tribunal.
Several judges were accused in West-German courts, but were acquitted for the lack of 
malicious intent. The first case where the Supreme Court of the German Federal Republic 
was asked to rule directly on the criminal liability of a judge was a case in 1952 against 
judges of a military tribunal. The judges had after the capitulation of the German forces 
in May 1945 convicted three sailors to death for desertion.35 The Supreme Court stated 
that disproportional punishments were against an ‘unwritten basic assumption of German 
criminal law’. The position would entail that judges who had applied death sentence to 
persons accused of relatively insignificant offences would be liable to punishment. This 
caused former judges to mobilise.36 In later cases, the courts departed from this line of 
reasoning. The position was reversed in a ruling from 1956 against Dr. Otto Thorbeck 
and Walter Huppenkothen. 37
Thorbeck and Huppenkothen were charged as judge and prosecutor of an SS Tribu-
nal. The tribunal tried admiral Canaris and several of his associates in the concentration 
camps of Sachsenhausen and Flossenbürg on April 6 and 8 1945 for participation in 
33 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. III, the Justice Case, 
Washington 1951. For a presentation and discussion of the case see Fraser 2012.
34 See further Graver 2015 chapter 7.
35 BGH, Urteil vom 29. 5. 1952 – 2 StR 45/50.
36 See Garbe, Im Namen des Volkes?! Die Rechtlichen Grundlagen der Militärjustiz im NS-Staat 
und ihre “Bewältigung” nach 1945 in Erinnerungsarbeit Grundlage einer Kultur des Friedens, eds. 
Nolz, Bernhard and Popp (Lit Verlag 2000) p. 110.
37 BGH, Urteil vom 19.06.1956 - 1 StR 50/56 (LG Augsburg).
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attempts to assassinate Adolf Hitler. According to documents found by the Gestapo, Ca-
naris and his associates had been engaged in several plots to murder Adolf Hitler. 
The Supreme Court dealt with the case three times. In the final round, it acquitted the 
two for their participation in the trials against Canaris and his associates. The Supreme 
Court had as its starting point that every state has a right to defend itself, and that the 
right to enact strong measures against attacks on the state, had to be extended to the Nazi 
state. The Supreme Court regarded the trials as ordinary trials, even though they had 
taken place as summary proceedings in the concentration camps where the accused were 
held, and based its ruling on the avowal of the defendants that they had perceived them-
selves free to perform their functions as judge and prosecutor according to the merits of 
the cases at hand. The trials were severely deficient from a procedural point of view, but 
the deficiencies of the trials were regarded as mostly ‘formal’. In light of the burden of 
proof that must be met in a criminal case, the court held that it could not be established 
that the trials were not real trials, and that it could not in any case be established that the 
defendants did not perceive them as real trials. On these grounds, they were both ac-
quitted, although Huppenkothen was punished for participating in the execution of the 
sentences without receiving the necessary confirmation from the higher authorities. The 
same standard was applied by Norwegian courts after the war in trials against German SS 
judges and members of German Standgerichte.38
In the Rehse case, the German Supreme Court stated that a judge could only be pun-
ished for voting for a death sentence if he so voted for nefarious reasons.39 Hans-Joachim 
Rehse had been a member of the Volksgerichtshof, in the words of US prosecutor Telford 
Taylor ‘the most notorious Nazi judicial innovation’.40 In addition, Rehse had been co-as-
sessor with the infamous Roland Freisler in many of his capital cases. The Supreme Court 
stated that the judges of the People’s Court were independent, equal and only bound by 
the law. Their sole duty was to follow their own legal conviction.41 The judges serving here 
could only be held responsible for sentences they pronounced out of malicious reasons 
outside the scope of their legal beliefs.
We see that the case law against the Nazi judges based itself on the standard currently 
expressed by the Council of Europe. The rules that emerge from this case law are: Only 
judges acting maliciously can be held to account. A judge who keeps to his role as a 
judge, acting independently, cannot be met with criminal sanctions however unjust or 
oppressive the law is and however summarily the proceedings are, as long as there is some 
resemblance of a trail. The end result of the cases after the Nazi regime was that virtually 
38 See Graver 2015 pp. 182-184 and The Latza case, reported in Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals vol. XIV, United Nations War Crimes Commission, London 1949.
39 BGH, Urteil vom 30. 4. 1968 - 5 StR 670/67.
40 The Justice Case p. 38.
41 BGH, Urteil vom 30. 4. 1968 - 5 StR 670/67.
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no judges were punished. In effect, the international tribunals and national courts alike 
allowed for a set of excuses and exonerating circumstances, thereby establishing a special 
judicial immunity. 
Due to the burden of proof in criminal cases, a judge who denies that he has been 
acting under instruction or motivated by extraneous motives will hardly be convicted if 
his judgment was legally possible given the facts that were presented to him and the law 
at the time, provided only that the basics of a judicial procedure is followed.
4.3 The Cases against Judges of the GDR
German courts were called upon again to rule upon the responsibility of judges after the 
reunification of Germany in 1990. After Germany´s unification, the German judiciary 
carried out a large-scale investigation and adjudication of the crimes of the GDR regime. 
The trials that were held can be seen as one of the steps taken to end the situation estab-
lished by the courts after the breakdown of the Nazi regime - where crimes committed by 
the state apparatus in oppressive regimes went unpunished.42 Similar to the Nazi period, 
the judicial system of the GDR was also a system employed by the regime as an appa-
ratus in the pursuit of political aims and as an instrument of political persecution and 
oppression. There were, however, also important differences. Compared to the Nazis, the 
GDR regime used law only in a marginal way to legitimise itself.43 On the other hand, 
the communist party conducted trials as mere show trials in a pseudo-judicial propagan-
da-play. In important cases, the punishment of the defendant was decided by the Central 
Committee of the party, before the indictment, and before any judicial proceedings had 
been held.44
The cases against prosecutors and judges of the GDR were the largest group of the cas-
es initiated against representatives of the GDR regime for crimes against its population.45 
Together 374 such cases against 618 accused were opened, 36.6% of the total number of 
the cases brought against former leaders and functionaries of the GDR state. Less than 5% 
of the prosecutors and judges of the GDR were charged. The charges resulted in 181 con-
victions for ‘bending the law’, bringing the conviction rate to 24% of the accusations. In 
42 See Marxen und Werle (Hrsg.), Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht Dokumentation, Band 5/1 Teilband 
Rechtsbeugung (De Gruyter 2007) p. XIX.
43 See Rottleuthner, Steuerung der Justiz in der DDR, 75 Kritische Vierteljahrersschrift für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1992) pp. 237-264 at p. 119.
44 Werkentin 1994 p. 119
45 Marxen and Werle 2007 p. XXIX.
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addition, in a lot more cases the courts concluded that the judicial decisions had violated 
basic principles of the rule of law.46
Initially, the legal doctrine was sceptical to applying criminal sanctions against judges 
of the GDR regime. According to the opinions of many scholars, sanctions were ruled out 
because of the statute of limitation. In addition, many contested the rights of the Federal 
Republic as a successor to enforce infringements against the law in the GDR.47
The first case at the German Supreme Court was a case from 1993 against members 
of a labour court accused of upholding an unjust dismissal.48 Here, the Supreme Court 
stated that German courts could hold judges of the former GDR accountable, but that 
apart from cases of clear departures of the law of the GDR at the time, liability would have 
to be restricted to instances where the rights of individuals were substantially infringed 
in an obvious way to the point of being arbitrary. This restrictive approach followed from 
the prohibition against applying present law retroactively to the detriment of the GDR 
judges.
In determining what was to be considered as substantial and obvious infringements 
of individual rights, the Court referred to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, which the GDR had ratified in 1976. Since this only formed part of the 
argument, one can say that the Supreme Court based its reasoning partly on positive law, 
in the form of ratified international conventions, and partly on the natural law argument 
of Radbruch.49 In the opinion of the Court, the judges of the GDR had had the possibility 
within the prevailing legal method to interpret and apply the law of the GDR in such a 
way as not to commit substantial and obvious infringements of individual rights under-
stood in this way. For this reason, their judgments were also illegal at the time when they 
manifestly departed from the basic core of justice.
The objective conditions for applying criminal sanctions were elaborated in later cas-
es. In the case of 16 November 1995 against a member of the Supreme Court of the GDR, 
the German Supreme Court recapitulated the following requirements: substantial and 
manifest human rights violations, intolerable disproportionate punishments and sub-
stantial violations of the right to a fair trial.50 
The Supreme Court in this way made a clear break with its case law from the post-Na-
zi trials in their cases against the GDR judiciary. The Court explicitly accorded with the 
criticism which had been voiced against its jurisprudence of the 1950s and 60s. The Court 
46 Marxen and Werle 2007 p. XXXVII.
47 See Schröder, Zehn Jahre strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung des DDR-Unrechts, NJW (2000) pp. 
3017-3022, at 3019.
48 BGH, Urteil vom 13.12.1993 5 StR 76/93.
49 See Marxen and Werle 2007 p. XLIII.
50 BGH, Urteil vom 16.11.1995, 5 StR 747/74.
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recognised that the standard they now applied would have led to the trial and conviction 
of numerous judges from the Nazi period - had it been applied by the courts in the after-
math after the Nazi regime. The Court stated that it was a ‘momentous failure’ of justice of 
the Federal Republic that this had not been done.51
5. Making the Case for Criminal Liability of Judges
5.1 Judges Acting Illegally
Based on the recommendations from international standard-setting bodies and exam-
ples of national law and cases where judicial liability has been the issue, we are ready to 
address the issue of criminal liability in more general terms. The question is not if, but 
when judges should be held accountable for oppressive rulings, and what the conditions 
of criminal accountability should be. We will look at this from different angels. Before we 
address the more difficult question of sanctioning judges for their acts within the law, we 
will make some observations on the situation when the judge is acting in a clearly illegal 
manner.
In many cases, authoritarian regimes restrict themselves to enacting oppressive laws, 
and leaves it to the courts to enforce these independently. Other authoritarian regimes 
are not as constrained in dealing with the judiciary. The Soviet authorities were notorious 
for their show trials and ‘telephone justice’ where judges were told directly by party offi-
cial or the procurator how to decide certain cases.52 In its vicious form, this reduced the 
judges to ‘mouthpieces’ of the tyrants.53 
Where the judge is under instruction, the resulting acts fulfil the condition of illegal-
ity. This is because the ruling is motivated by factors incongruous to the law, irrespective 
of whether the formal ruling is correct, judged by the facts or the law. In many of the 
show trials of the 1930ies and the 1950ies, the charges were of crimes that were invented 
for the purpose of the trial and based on facts that were fabricated by the security police. 
But the tragic fact is that in many cases defendants were guilty of breach of authoritarian 
and sometimes draconian laws, when they were charged with opposition to the regime 
51 ‘Darin, daß dies nicht geschehen ist, liegt ein folgenschweres Versagen bundesdeutscher 
Strafjustiz’ NJW 1996, 857, p. 864.
52 In the show trials, the decisions on whom to indict and what punishment to give them was made 
by the party in advance, and the prosecutor, judge and public defender were instructed in their 
roles and told in detail what to say during the trial. Even the defendant was given a script and 
instructed, see Pelikán (ed.) The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950-1954 (Stanford University 
Press 1971) pp. 110-114.
53 Parau, The Drive for Judicial Supremacy in Judicial Independence in Transition, ed. Sibert-Fohr 
(Springer 2012)p. 626.
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2016
141
for example in the form of sedition or illegal political activity. This did not make their 
conviction legal. The point is that their conviction was not made according to a legal pro-
ceeding. For example, judges in special courts of Norway during the German occupation 
who passed death sentences under conditions where they were told that if they refused, 
many more than the defendants would be executed by the Germans, where convicted of 
murder after the war.54 Proceedings where the outcome was determined by the executive 
in advance, and where judges were used as a mere staffage to give the executions an ap-
pearance of legality, were not recognised as judicial acts by the Norwegian courts after 
the occupation.
The practice of `telephone justice´ prevails in many post-authoritarian states today. 
In a global review, Transparency International has found that despite several decades 
of reform efforts and international instruments protecting judicial independence, judg-
es and court personnel around the world continue to face pressure to rule in favour of 
powerful political or economic entities, rather than according to the law.55 In many cases 
judges depend on being obedient to the presidential office or the hierarchical structure 
within the judiciary. It has been observed that in such cases, ‘the caller may change, but 
the telephone calls continue’.56 
When interference into the judiciary is the norm, we encounter another problem with 
holding the judges individually accountable. In these cases, the individual culpability 
comes into question.57 The situation of judges under such conditions seems comparable 
to that of public servants of the regime in general. By succumbing to orders of the exec-
utive they become just that; servants of the regime or of the ruling party. From the point 
of view of criminal law one could argue that they should be treated as such; no immunity, 
but also no greater responsibility stemming from the fact that they are formally labelled 
as judges by the regime. Whereas one can argue that the public trust requires that crim-
inal judges be brought to account, the situation is much more complex when it comes 
to public servants, since there is a different expectance of obedience and loyalty when it 
comes to public functionaries. Following a superior order to bend the law is not such an 
obvious crime for a bureaucrat as it is for a judge.
There is, however, an important difference between judges and other civil servants in 
the fact that the judges are the ones entrusted with the task of fulfilling the rights of the 
citizens to a fair trial. If a person charged with an offence is brought to trial and the judge 
decides the case based on an instruction received from someone else, he is depriving the 
54 See Graver 2015 pp. 179-184.
55 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007 Corruption in Judicial Systems 
(Cambridge University Press 2007)  p. xxii-xxiii
56 Nußberger, Judicial Reforms in Post-Soviet Countries – Good Intentions with Flawed results? in 
Judicial Independence in Transition, ed. Siebert-Fohr (Springer 2012)p. 892.
57 See Murphy 2015 p. 67.
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accused of the right to a fair trial. The judge is therefore directly and personally respon-
sible for infringing a human right of the accused. If the judge is acting under duress or 
threats, this could be an explanation, and possibly an excuse, but may never be a justifi-
cation of the act.
5.2 The Argument for Criminal Liability for Oppressive Judges
The question is more complicated when it comes to judges who exercise an individual 
discretion within the law, as it is perceived at the time. The main problem of holding the 
Nazi judges accountable was that they were as a whole acting in accordance with the law 
as defined by their time. The independence of the judiciary was mostly upheld and re-
spected by the Nazi authorities. Trials were held that respected at least the rudiments of a 
fair trial, and the judges were not given instructions on how to decide individual cases.58 
There were exceptions from this picture, but the cases after the fall of the regime against 
judges were cases where the judge had come to his ruling independently, based on the 
facts and the law. The judges oppressed opposition to the regime, but this was a conse-
quence of the fact that the law oppressed enemies of the people and the ‘German blood’.
As we saw above, the Nazi judges went scot-free. This was not the case with the GDR 
judges who were convicted for bending the law, even where there was no evidence to 
support the fact that they had acted under instruction. It can be argued that the German 
courts after the reunification of Germany went too far in their endeavour to rectify the 
sins of omission of their predecessors after the war. The standard of proportionality is 
open to judgement, and so is the condition of substantive violations. This must be seen 
in relation to the fact that the standards are applied to conditions where the judgments 
are made in accordance with the established practice and dominant opinion on what the 
law is at the time of its application. A judge can therefore according to this standard be 
held accountable for loyal application of positive law, if the legal practice itself amounts 
to substantial violations of human rights or applies punishments that are intolerable dis-
proportionate. According to this standard, US judges applying sentencing rules in cir-
cumstances where minor offences lead to life-time imprisonment without possibility of 
parole, could be committing a criminal offense, at least if judged by European standards 
under Article 5 ECHR.
Discretionary standards of liability are of particular danger in societies where the 
rule of law is not well established as part of the political and legal tradition.  Pressure on 
judges is applied in many ways, and one such way is to instigate bogus criminal proceed-
ings against judges who refuse to bend to the demands of outside forces. If the judiciary 
in general is weak, this increases the risk of miscarriage of justice in such cases, so that 
58 See Graver 2015 pp. 39-41.
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honest judges may be wrongly convicted on false charges of corruption or other forms 
of misuse of office.59 In such situations, there is a trade-off between protecting the honest 
judges from false allegations, and letting the judges who are actually guilty of various 
forms of misuse enjoy immunity. Seen in a dynamic perspective, the rule of law may be 
better served by insisting on judicial immunity when the judiciary as such lacks inde-
pendence from the state. There is a trade-off for holding judges accountable for past sins, 
particularly in a society struggling to build an institution of independent judges with 
integrity to follow the rule of law.
In the Russian Federation, judicial immunity was restricted by a reform package of 
2001. According to the new regulations, judges could face criminal charges for ‘both offi-
cial and non-official actions demonstrating constituent elements of a relevant offence’.60 The 
Polish Constitutional Court is also aware of this danger when it states: 
The significance of judicial immunity is particularly profound in countries where de-
mocracy and mechanisms for the separation of powers have not yet been consolidated. 
Independence of judges and courts may exist without the need for the institution of im-
munity in countries of mature democracy, already-fixed understanding of the separation 
of powers and high legal and political culture, as these factors minimise the political risk 
of abusing the possibility of a judge’s removal from office owing to the content of judge-
ments delivered by them.61
This argument states a need of different standards of immunity in the established rule 
of law states and the states where the institutions of the rule of law are more exposed to 
erosion. However, this coin has two sides. On the one hand there is a need to protect the 
judges who try to uphold the rule of law under such circumstances against adverse mea-
sures from the executive and collaborating judges. On the other hand, it is necessary to be 
able to hold judges who collaborate with the regime in the breakdown of the rule of law 
when the rule of law is (re)established, accountable. How can one achieve this without 
undermining the position of courageous judges in opposition to oppressive regimes, by 
legitimizing the use of sanctions against them?
This dilemma calls for a cautious approach to the criminalisation of judges, particu-
larly in times of transition and political instability. In political settings where a tradition 
with respect for the judicial independence is lacking, pressure may be applied on judges to 
decide cases in specific ways by many means. Criminal proceedings against a judge could 
59 Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella, Bribes, punishment and judicial immunity, Transparency 
International, Global Corruption Report 2007 Corruption in Judicial Systems (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) p. 305.
60 Schwartz and Sykainen, Judicial Independence in the Russian Federation in Judicial Independence 
in Transition, ed. Siebert-Fohr (Springer 2012) p. 1035.
61 Judgement of 28th November 2007, K 39/07 PROCEDURE FOR DEROGATION OF JUDICIAL 
IMMUNITY (OTK ZU 2007, No. 10A, item 129 ) paragraph 15 (accessed 20.05.2016 at http://
trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/K_39_07_GB.pdf)
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be one. Charges of corruption are often employed against oppositional judges. To avoid 
this, one could argue that judges should have full immunity against criminal charges, and 
not only a functional immunity. At the least, the decision to press charges against a judge, 
or to lift the immunity against charges, should not be in the hands of the executive, of the 
prosecuting authority or any other political body. In addition, a judge should have access 
to an independent and impartial review of an action brought against him or her.
Full immunity will, however, be to go too far, and can contribute to undermining the 
confidence of the public in the judicial system. There is a legitimate need to be able to 
remove and punish judges who commit obvious crimes outside the scope of their official 
functions. If judges are immune at the outset, there will therefore always be a need of 
mechanisms to lift this immunity in individual cases - and such mechanisms are prone 
to misuse. The recommendation of the Venice commission that immunity be reserved to 
a functional immunity therefore seems sound. At the same time, it is important that the 
separation of the judiciary from other state powers is ensured and that the legal order 
provides for appropriate guarantees, both in law and practise, against the misuse of crim-
inal and disciplinary measures to the detriment of judicial independence.62 In countries 
with an established practise of interference into the work of the judiciary, the application 
of sanctions will always be ground for suspicion, since it is an effective way of disciplining 
judges who refuse to keep in line.
Judges should not have privileges that go beyond what is necessary for their function 
as protectors of the rule of law. This does not imply, however, that they should have full 
functional immunity against criminal prosecution. Taking the protection of the rule of 
law as a starting point, one could argue that their responsibility should stretch further 
than to cases of malice. As we see from the post-Nazi trials, a condition of malice will in 
practice lead to the fact that judges are not accountable for their participation in crimes 
committed by authoritarian regimes in legal forms, whereas policy-makers, administra-
tors and members of other professions are held to account. Such a result is hard to ac-
cept, and speaks against the keeping of the independence of the judiciary. As stressed in 
international documents on judicial independence, the independence of judges is not a 
prerogative or privilege in their own interest, but in the interests of the rule of law and 
those seeking and expecting justice.63 
When judges are engaged in a systematic undermining of the rule of law, the argu-
ment of judicial independence therefore should not protect them against responsibly. A 
judge thus engaged, can hardly plead ignorance of wrongdoing. In the case of the leaders 
62 See ECtHR Case Oleksandr Volokov v. Ukraine, (Application no. 21722/11), Judgment 9 January 
2013 paragraph 199.
63 Opinion no 1 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) concerning the 
independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges paragraph 10.
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of the GDR, who developed and enforced the scheme of killing those who tried to escape 
over the border to West-Germany, the European Court of Human Rights stated: 
The State practice in issue was to a great extent the work of the applicants themselves, 
who, as political leaders, knew – or should have known – that it infringed both funda-
mental rights and human rights, since they could not have been ignorant of the legisla-
tion of their own country.64 
In this case the right to life and the principle of proportionality when applying deadly 
force was well established in the law, but was disregarded in the orders and practice that 
was enforced in the control of the border. The same reasoning must be applied to a judge 
who systematically and obviously undermines basic and essential elements of the rule of 
law, such as the independence of the judiciary and fundamental human rights.
Then the issue is transferred from the question of the subjective intent of the judge, 
to the question of when a judge is engaged in a scheme of systematic undermining of the 
rule of law. Under certain circumstances, this is not only a breach of national law, but also 
an offence that is made criminal directly by international law, both as regards to the pro-
hibited conduct and the individual criminal responsibility for it. This criminal respon-
sibility follows from international customary law, particularly after the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials. It is now codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
After the international adoption of the Rome Statute, judges can be guilty of genocide 
and crimes against humanity when applying and enforcing the domestic law. In the fu-
ture, this should be the standard according to which judges should be brought to account.
Under international human rights law, states have an obligation to prosecute perpe-
trators of serious human rights violations. According to the jurisprudence of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights, member states must criminalise and punish violations of fun-
damental values and aspects of the human rights entailed in the European Convention.65 
It has been shown for a long time that also judges can be responsible for atrocities under 
international law, committed as part of the application and enforcement of domestic law. 
This was first established by the US Military Tribunal against leaders of the Nazi legal 
system, and has since been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights. 
The Nuremberg trials showed that judges can be held responsible under international 
law, not only for war crimes, but also for administering the law against a country’s own 
nationals. The Military Tribunal established that it was a crime for judges to administer 
laws that were part of the regime’s discriminatory policy and extermination of Jews and 
64 ECtHR case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany (Applications nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 
44801/98) judgement 22 March 2001 paragraph 103.
65 In for instance ECtHR case of K.U. v Finland, application no 2872/02, Judgement of 2 December 
2008.
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Poles, and to undertake an arbitrary and brutal enforcement of oppressive laws ‘shocking 
to the conscience of mankind’.
Because of the findings of the Tribunal, judges may be held accountable under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Based on the statute, judges can be 
found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity also when applying and enforc-
ing municipal law. According to Article 7(2) a, an attack against any civilian population 
means a course of conduct ‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack’. Enforcing the laws of the regime cannot be a defence. On the con-
trary, it serves as a factor substantiate that the condition of furtherance of a State policy 
is fulfilled.66
International law is, as we know, not directly applicable in domestic law in all jurisdic-
tions, at least not as a sufficient legal basis for applying criminal sanctions or to supplant 
rules of domestic law. Whether judges can be held responsible by national courts must 
therefore be answered within each legal order according to its own legal principles and 
rules. But the German experiences, together with the fact that judges can be punished by 
international courts and tribunals, give valuable insights and arguments to be considered 
when addressing this question in a national legal contexts.
It seems at the outset quite reasonable to assume that there exists a core of justice, 
present in the minds of ‘all civilized people’, and that to this core belong substantial and 
manifest human rights violations, intolerable disproportionate punishments and sub-
stantial violations of the right to a fair trial. On the other hand, the words of the US Mil-
itary Tribunal on the draconic punishments delivered by German courts during the war, 
with the minimum of procedural guarantees, are a note of caution to finding self-evident 
requirements of justice: ‘Every nation recognizes the absolute necessity of more stringent 
enforcement of the criminal law in times of great emergency’ and 
in the face of a real and present danger, freedom of speech may be somewhat restricted 
even in America. Can we then say that in the throes of total war and in the presence 
of impending disaster those officials who enforced these savage laws in a last desperate 
effort to stave off defeat were guilty of crimes against humanity?67
What seems beyond question to many people today might not be so self-evident to 
people in a totally different setting tomorrow. At least, it was not so to the defenders of 
democracy and the rule of law in 1948. On the other hand, to become an international le-
gal rule, a practice needs not be a universally recognised. It is sufficient that it is accepted 
by civilised nations in general.68
66 See The Justice Case p. 984.
67 The Justice Case p. 1026.
68 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV Digest of Laws and Cases, United Nations 
War Crimes Commission, London 1949 p. 10.
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It appears to be very difficult to find a fixed core of justice that can be seen as intuitive-
ly valid as law under all conditions and at all times. Regimes can decide to depart from 
international obligations in their own internal law, and judges be put under an obligation 
to enforce it. Morally, they can be under an obligation to refuse, resign or to find ways 
to bend the law, but to say they are guilty of crimes under their own law is a different 
question. At the same time, however, they might be committing criminal acts from the 
perspective of international law.
The standard ‘substantial and obvious infringements of individual rights’ might be con-
sidered by some as vague and of little guidance for determining the extent of the obliga-
tion of judges. As such, some might argue that it is in itself in contradiction to the rule 
of law. The way the standard has been applied gives little credence to this objection. It 
could, nevertheless, be useful, not least as guidance to judges who find themselves in a 
difficult situation, to give the standard a little more substance. A useful starting point can 
be found in the Rome Statute of the International Court of Criminal Justice. Articles 6–8 
define the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as they are under 
the jurisdiction of the ICCJ.69 Prohibitions against slavery, genocide, racial discrimina-
tion and torture are among the norms frequently cited as jus cogens - that is basic norms 
of international law which are universally binding and  cannot be contracted away.
Central to the definition of genocide is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Central to the definitions of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes are that the acts represent a widespread or systematic attack or 
are part of a plan or policy or of a large-scale commission. Use of legislative means will 
often include intent, policy and actions on a widespread or systematic scale. When giving 
effect to such laws, judges will easily be in a situation where these conditions are fulfilled, 
as shown by the US Military Tribunal against the Nazi lawyers. In its introductory com-
ments to the application of Control Council Law No, 10 as legal basis for punishment it 
stated:
As we construe it, that section provides for punishment of crimes committed against 
German nationals only where there is proof of conscious participation in systematic 
government organized or approved procedures amounting to atrocities and offenses of 
the kind specified in the act and committed against populations or amounting to perse-
cutions on political, racial, or religious grounds.70
The inclusion of a condition of ‘systematic government organized or approved proce-
dures’ by the Military Tribunal, of ‘widespread or systematic attack or as part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large-scale commission’ by the Rome Statute, in addition to the condi-
tion of ‘substantial and obvious infringements of individual rights’ lends more substance to 
69 See Jescheck 2004 on the relationship between the Nuremberg trials and the ICC statute.
70 The Justice Case p. 982.
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the norm as a basis for criminal sanctions. Based on historic experience, it seems unlikely 
that successor regimes will go much further than this in their dealings with offenders 
of predecessor oppressive regimes. To include a requirement of systematic attacks will 
therefore probably not reduce the efficiency of transitional justice in dealing with the af-
termath of dictatorship. However, it will heighten the standard of the rule of law in such 
proceedings and check arguments based on assertions that ‘substantial and obvious in-
fringements of individual rights’ is too vague a standard to apply in criminal proceedings 
against a judge who had been applying the law of the time. 
Judges who are called upon to enforce authoritarian or oppressive measures should 
take note of the prohibitions against ‘imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law and persecution against any 
identifiable group or collection on political, racial and other grounds’. These prohibitions 
will easily be violated when enforcing measures of interning people in opposition and 
criticism of the regime in power. When such measures are enacted in, for example, emer-
gency legislation, they must readily be regarded as systematic and as part of a plan or 
policy. The same is the case if justice is systematically denied members of a political or 
ethnic group.
For deprival of the basic minimum of a fair trial or for grossly unjust punishments, it 
is not obvious that there needs to be an element of discrimination included. The ECtHR 
has recently stated that fundamental principles of justice can limit the punishments that 
legally can be inflicted by a state upon defendants in criminal cases. In its judgment in 
the case of Vinter and other v. the UK, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR accepted that 
a grossly disproportionate sentence could amount to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3, 
even if matters of appropriate sentencing largely fell outside the scope of the European 
Convention.71
However,  the Court also considered that ‘gross disproportionality’ is a strict test, 
and that it would only be on ‘rare and unique occasions’ that the test would be met. Hav-
ing violations of fundamental rights in a systematic manner as the condition for judicial 
responsibility, removes the cause for arguments that judicial responsibility threatens the 
independence of the judiciary. Such systematic violations can never be justified by an 
appeal to the rule of law. At the same time there is no need to prove malicious intent to 
punish an individual judge. Criminal guilt can be established by the objective facts, to-
gether with the fact that no judge can claim with credibility that he was unaware of doing 
something wrong. This means that it is actually possible to find a judge guilty under the 
presence of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof of the prosecution. 
Defining the criminal responsibility in this way is also less prone to misuse by author-
itarian rulers as an instrument to discipline disloyal judges. The conditions will simply 
71 ECtHR case of Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom Applications nos. 66069/09 and 130/10 
and 3896/10, Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 9 July 2013 paragraph 102.
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not be fulfilled unless the judge is acting in accordance with a more general policy of the 
authorities in power. The conditions are also much harder to misconstrue than a require-
ment of ‘departure from the law’ or ‘malicious intent’ that are the terms often used to 
define judicial responsibility.
